responses_to_ai:affordances:lab_affordances
Affordances for AI labs
Published 25 January 2023
This is a list of actions AI labs could take that may be strategically relevant (or consequences or characteristics of possible actions).
List
- Deploy an AI system
- Pursue AI capabilities
- Pursue risky (and more or less alignable systems) systems
- Pursue systems that enable risky (and more or less alignable) systems
- Pursue weak AI that's mostly orthogonal to progress in risky stuff for a specific (strategically significant) task or goal
- This could enable or abate catastrophic risks besides unaligned AI
- Do alignment (and related) research (or: decrease the alignment tax by doing technical research)
- Including interpretability and work on solving or avoiding alignment-adjacent problems like decision theory and strategic interaction and maybe delegation involving multiple humans or multiple AI systems
- Advance global capabilities
- Publish capabilities research
- Cause investment or spending in big AI projects to increase
- Advance alignment (or: decrease the alignment tax) in ways other than doing technical research
- Support and coordinate with external alignment researchers
- Attempt to align a particular system (or: try to pay the alignment tax)
- Interact with other labs
- Coordinate with other labs (notably including coordinating to avoid risky systems)
- Make themselves transparent to each other
- Make themselves transparent to an external auditor
- Merge
- Effectively commit to share upsides
- Effectively commit to stop and assist
- Affect what other labs believe on the object level (about AI capabilities or risk in general, or regarding particular memes)
- Practice selective information sharing
- Demonstrate AI risk (or provide evidence about it)
- Negotiate with other labs, or affect other labs' incentives or meta-level beliefs
- Affect public opinion, media, and politics
- Publish research
- Make demos or public statements
- Release or deploy AI systems
- Improve their culture or operations
- Improve operational security
- Affect attitudes of effective leadership
- Affect attitudes of researchers
- Make a plan for alignment (e.g., OpenAI's); share it; update and improve it; and coordinate with capabilities researchers, alignment researchers, or other labs if relevant
- Make plans for what to do with powerful AI (e.g. a process for producing powerful aligned AI given some type of advanced AI system, or a specification for parties interacting peacefully)
- Improve their ability to make themselves (selectively) transparent
- Try to better understand the future, the strategic landscape, risks, and possible actions
- Acquire resources (money, hardware, talent, influence over states, status/prestige/trust, etc.)
- Affect other actors' resources
- Affect the flow of talent between labs or between projects
- Plan, execute, or participate in pivotal acts or processes
- Capture scarce resources
- E.g., language data from language model users
Primary author: Zach Stein-Perlman
responses_to_ai/affordances/lab_affordances.txt · Last modified: by katjagrace
